AI-Driven Audit Uncovers Four Critical Zero-Day Flaws in MPC Wallet Library

At least one of the flaws allows an attacker to freeze user funds. For any team shipping multi-party computation custody, this breaks a core invariant at the signing layer.

The disclosure so far

The headline finding is a previously unknown bug that immobilizes assets rather than draining them. Three additional zero-days sit in the same library. The full technical write-up was not present in the cited material at the time of writing — specifics remain preliminary. What the report already confirms: the audit was AI-assisted, the affected library is unnamed in the headline, and the worst-case outcome is fund freeze, not fund loss.

Freezing is the wrong shape of failure for incident response. Frozen assets still carry legal exposure. They still block withdrawals. They still trigger the same disclosure obligations as a theft. The mechanism is denial-of-state, not extraction. The user-side result is identical: funds cannot move.

The custody surface is failing in parallel

The disclosure lands the same week payment protocol Triple-A lost more than $9.7 million in a hot wallet custody exploit. Per PeckShieldAlert data cited by AMBCrypto, the attacker drained tokens across TRON, Ethereum, Polygon, and Arbitrum, then bridged the proceeds to Ethereum. Triple-A had not acknowledged the breach. Deposits reportedly remained live while funds continued to leave.

Two failure modes converge. Hot operational wallets continue to leak under key compromise. MPC libraries ship with undocumented state assumptions. Both point to the same gap: invariant testing under adversarial input was not performed before deployment.

What to verify in your stack

A direct pass for any team handling custody code:

• Trace every path that can invalidate, revoke, or replace a key share. None of them should be able to halt signature aggregation permanently.
• Confirm the signing protocol tolerates partial participant failure without freezing future transactions.
• Treat any single condition that blocks signature aggregation as an attack vector until proven otherwise.
• Separate operational hot wallets from cold storage. For high-value keys, the hardware signing layer remains the deterministic floor — the specific features that floor must enforce are laid out in this hardware wallet security breakdown.